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Abstract 
The issue of Chinese assertiveness has become a big focus area for International 
Relations scholars in recent years due to China’s growing global and regional 
impact in Asia, which is increasingly challenging USA’s hard and soft power in 
the region. The purpose of this thesis is to nuance the realist interpretation of the 
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea by applying a Copenhagen School 
theory of Security Studies theoretical framework to uncover underlying motives 
and incentives for China’s actions. The study highlights how important the aspect 
of political security is for China’s South China Sea-policy as the sea is a key 
factor in China’s continued economic development. The study furthermore shows 
how cautious China is to not securitise the dispute, which partially can be 
explained by wariness toward audience costs created by future nationalist protests. 
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1. Introduction 
The South China Sea has during the 21
st
 century almost become synonymous with 
Chinese assertiveness in China’s relationship with its peripheral Southeast Asian 
neighbours. Contestation about influence has also arisen with the USA, who has a 
lot of influence and military presence in the region. The South China Sea has 
become a flashpoint for disputes over sovereignty between bordering states in the 
region. Starting in the 1970s contestation about sovereignty over territory has 
been an increasing issue for Southeast Asian states, as it has become a protracted 
issue in an otherwise pragmatic and cooperative regional dynamic (Kaplan, 2016). 
China has shown great interest in forcefully asserting its claims to sovereignty in 
the region since the 1970s, when they first forced another state to leave an island 
in the South China Sea (Shirk, 2014). China has to a large extent been a common 
denominator for all the Southeast Asian states that have territory in the South 
China Sea as they have been forced to respond to and handle Chinese 
assertiveness in response to China’s claim to sovereignty over almost the whole of 
the South China Sea – in reference to China’s “Nine-dash line document” 
(FMPRC, 2016).  
Furthermore, a great concern for the USA and Southeast Asian states regarding 
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has been China’s major land 
reclamation projects and the construction of military forward operating bases in 
contested areas on different locations in the South China Sea. These artificial 
islands have come under international scrutiny since the start of the construction 
due to their questionable legality in reference to international law and 
international security concerns (Shugart, 2016). The Permanent Arbitral Tribunal 
in The Hague (2016) recently concluded that these artificial islands that China is 
creating cannot be used as the baseline for a claim to an Exclusive Economic 
Zone, which might have been a partial explanation for China’s decision to 
construct these islands. This verdict is however something that China should have 
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foreseen, as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 
1994) is very clear on what constitutes an island and not, perhaps indicating that 
China are not that concerned with abiding to international law in this issue. This 
aligns with the path that China started to walk in 2008 during the end of Hu 
Jintao’s presidency (2002-12) when China’s approach to foreign policy changed 
dramatically from a ‘gentle giant’ to a more assertive actor (Lam, 2016), which 
perhaps is best exemplified by the treatment of president Obama on his state visit 
to China 2008, which can be described as cold (Shirk, 2014). China’s new 
approach to the foreign policy arena has had a big impact on the view of China 
internationally, with a great explosion in the use of the words China and 
assertiveness in the same sentence since then (Johnston, 2014; Nye, 2005). 
China’s new firmer approach to foreign policy issues is a topic that scholars and 
commentators follow closely, as China have started to challenge some of the 
dynamics and structures in the international system that have been steadfast since 
the end of the Cold War. 
The issue of Chinese assertiveness has become a big focus area for International 
Relations scholars in recent years due to China’s growing global and regional 
impact in Asia, which is increasingly challenging USA’s hard and soft power in 
the region (Glaser, 2011). Conceptualizations of the South China Sea dispute have 
often been concerned with the changing power dynamics in the region, due to 
China’s emerging international footprint. Examples of this is John Mearsheimer’s 
(2014) article called “Can China rise peacefully?”, which situates the issue within 
a structural realist framework where the South China Sea dispute is used as proof 
for China’s increasing challenge to US hegemony. Also liberal theorists like 
Joseph Nye are concerned with increased Chinese power projection in the region, 
where they increasingly are challenging and questioning existing norms and 
institutions that help govern the international system (Callahan, 2015). 
Challenging existing structures of power is therefore a theme that has become 
synonymous with the South China Sea dispute from the perspective of state-
centric theories of international relations. Notions of a ‘rising power’ and 
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‘anarchy’ are terms that are inherently connected to the state-centric 
understanding of China’s increasing assertiveness towards its neighbours. 
According to for example Mearsheimer’s (2014) structural realist perspective 
China is acting in line with their growing power and influence, as the 
characteristics of the international system make this the rational action to take. 
Emphasis is here placed on how some structural variables affects a state’s 
decisions, which to some extent takes these actions for granted with reference to 
rationality as a driving force. That is; the structure of the system affects the 
actions of the actors in it. This naturally also applies to the realm of security 
where threats are framed within the context of the anarchic international system. 
However, what does this perspective tell us about the motivations and, perhaps 
more importantly, the intentions of an actor?  
This thesis aims to provide a competing understanding of China’s assertiveness in 
the South China Sea to existing mainstream realist interpretations of the issue by 
employing Copenhagen School Theory (CST) and critical discourse analysis, and 
in this way provide agency to China’s leadership for China’s foreign policy. 
However, the thesis does not intend to question the validity of realist 
interpretations of China’s assertiveness, rather the thesis intends to evaluate how 
well CST and a constructivist notion of security can provide a competing 
explanation, due to the difference in epistemological and ontological perspectives. 
What this thesis primarily intends to achieve through employing CST is therefore 
to situate Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea in a broader context and to 
uncover underlying motivations and intentions that may be neglected when 
assuming that an actors motivations and intentions are connected to structures.  
1.1 Research question 
 
 To what extent can Copenhagen School securitisation theory and a 
broadened security perspective help explain Chinese assertiveness in 
the South China Sea since 2010? 
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2. Theory 
In a realist understanding of international relations the foreign policy of a state is 
dictated by a countries national interest, known as the raison d'État ("reason of 
state") (see Mearsheimer, 1995: 9-13). The national interest of a sovereign state is 
inherently connected to the concept of self-help and of survival, as the foreign 
policy of a state is a result of its intent to continue to exist as an entity 
(Mearsheimer, 1995: 9-13). However, as mentioned above, realism takes the 
intentions and motivations regarding the foreign policy of states for granted, 
which can become very problematic when a state’s actions need to be nuanced. 
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea is a good example of this, which to 
a realist-eye is viewed in the context of self-help and survival. This creates a 
picture of china’s actions as aggressive, as they are behaving in a manner which 
through a realist perspective is rational if you want to expand your power and 
influence, to ensure your own survival. An example of this is John Mearsheimer’s 
view of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (2014). However, as Susan 
Shirk rightly points out, by viewing a state’s objectives as static we can also fall 
in trap of preconditioning the behaviour of other states, by characterising other 
state’s actions as a result of their inherit national character, even though we are 
aware of how many different factors influence the foreign policy of our own states 
(Shirk, 2014: 2).  
The foundation that the thesis takes inspiration from and that the choice of theory 
builds upon is the idea of their existing more variables at play to China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea than the wish to challenge existing power 
structures in the international system and to survive in the anarchic international 
system. Domestic issues, such as internal politics within the communist party, 
youth movements, economic reformation and other internal structural variables 
may also affect China’s actions, which this thesis intends to explore further. Susan 
Shirk (2014) and Jessica Chen Weiss (2014) have both highlighted how domestic 
politics and other internal issues have historically have affected China’s foreign 
policy and international footprint, which this thesis will take inspiration from. 
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Copenhagen School Theory (CST) is in this context valuable as a framework as it 
enables the researcher to move away from a rigid view of security issues to a 
more fluid understanding, where security issues exits in the eye of the beholder 
and where security dynamics are formed through social interaction. This will be 
valuable in this thesis as it will enable the possibility of contextualising the 
construction of security threats in a broader perspective. The theory section will 
start off with a short literature review over studies conducted on China that has 
used a CST-framework. After that audience costs will be brought in to the thesis 
as a concept through a short literature review over studies that have been 
conducted on relevant aspects of the connections between foreign policy and 
domestic politics in China and other countries, which will build a foundation for 
the rationality of using CST as a theoretical framework for this issue. The 
literature reviews will thereafter be followed by an outline of how CST will be 
used in the thesis. 
2.1 Literature Review 
A general point of critique that often is directed towards CST concerns the 
argument that it is euro-centric and built on assumptions concerning the social 
relations within a state which may not align with how the social structures in non-
European states function (Ratuva, 2016). CST and securitisation in a Chinese 
context is therefore a field that is relatively sparse in studies conducted. However, 
lately studies have started to emerge that have looked at CST in the context of 
Chinese energy and climate politics. Studies conducted by Phillips (2013), Nyman 
(2014), Nyman and Jinghan (2016) and Leung, Cherp, Jewell and Yi-Ming (2014) 
have all looked at how China during the last 10 years have started to increasingly 
securitise the energy sector through various means. The study conducted by 
Leung, Cherp, Jewell and Yi-Ming (2014) is particularly interesting as it shows 
how policy makers perceive energy security in terms of the security of supply-
chains and how they connect these supply-chains with national stability. 
According to the study oil imports represent one of China’s major vulnerabilities 
concerning energy security as the continuous import of crude oil is dependent on 
Fredrik Moberg 
 
 
8 
 
 
the navigability of strategic sea lanes of communication, off which the narrow 
straits of the entrances to the South China Sea are major bottleneck. Nyman and 
Jinghan’s (2016) study furthermore show the increasing emphasis that Chinese 
politicians put on non-traditional security issues as emerging security threats to 
China as China faces complex issues connected to its rapid industrialisation. 
Phillip’s (2013) in turn argues that the ‘Asian energy consumption revolution’ has 
the potential to destabilize regional order in East Asia as the energy area becomes 
increasingly securitised. 
Few studies have been conducted on China’s actions in the South China Sea in the 
context of securitisation, as interpretations through the lenses of regional power 
dynamics and realpolitik are prevalent theoretical outlooks on the dispute. 
However, Danner’s (2014) study of China’s and Japan’s dispute concerning 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea is very valuable as it studies how 
the dispute has been securitised and de-securitised by China and Japan at different 
occasions in the long course of the dispute. Danner found that a securitisation of 
the dispute most often occurred in connection with strong nationalist sentiment 
and activity, while de-securitisation would occur before the dispute turned violent 
(Danner, 2014: 240). Danner’s study of the connection between securitisation and 
nationalist sentiment connects well with the next section of the literature review 
that discusses audience costs and how the public can be used to show resolve 
during an international dispute. Another important study concerning South China 
Sea dispute is Odeyemi’s (2015) study of why the dispute not has been settled 
through the use of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS), which provides guidelines for how maritime disputes should be 
settled. One of Odeyemi’s main findings is that UNCLOS is not suitable to settle 
disputes that is framed within a security context by the disputants as the dispute 
has turned into a ‘dilemma’ for many of the actors through the increasing 
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‘securitisation’1 of the dispute (Odeyemi, 2015: 299). The following section will 
address the concept of audience costs. 
2.1.1 Audience costs 
Audience Costs will in this thesis be used in conjunction with CST to provide an 
explanation of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. The concept of 
audience costs has in academia been assumed to be only relevant for 
democratically governed states; however this short literature review brings forth 
studies arguing for audience costs being an important factor for autocratic regimes 
as well.  
The Democratic Peace Theory asserts that states with democratically elected 
leaders are less inclined to engage in armed conflict with each other (Kant, 1795; 
Doyle, 1983), which there also is some tentative empirical evidence supporting 
(Bremer, 1992). The aspects of culpability and accountability are within 
democratic peace theory seen as something that sharply divides the democratic 
states in the world from the non-democratic, authoritarian states, whose leaders 
are not susceptible to the same extent to public pressure and outcry. What 
democratic peace theory therefore claim is that democratic institutions creates 
structures for how the public can affect the foreign policy of a state through the 
leader’s fear of repercussions and blowbacks if they act irrationally and not 
according to norms – which can be understood as a form of cost that is derived 
from public sentiment concerning the government’s actions. Democratic peace 
theory highlights an interesting aspect of governance, which is the linkage 
between the governed and the governors, the leaders and the public. However, is 
this linkage really unique for democracies?  
James Fearon popularised the concept of audience costs in a paper that built on 
his previous research concerning costly signals. Fearon was mainly concerned 
with how state leaders could communicate resolve to opposing actors by “going 
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 Odeyemi uses another definition of ‘securitisation’ compared to this thesis 
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public” in disputes in order for actions to have effect on the dynamics of the 
dispute. A way of doing this according to Fearon was to create costly signals, 
which is a threat that is directed towards another actor which the sender would be 
cautious about sending if she was not serious, as not following through on the 
threat would incur some form of costs on the leader (Fearon, 1997: 69). 
According to Fearon a way of creating so called costly signals is to create 
audience costs, which Fearon defined as: “costs [that] arise chiefly from the 
reaction of domestic political audiences interested in whether foreign policy is 
being successfully or unsuccessfully handled by the leadership” (Fearon, 1997: 
69). By for example mobilizing troops or making political threats attention is 
given to the dispute by the relevant domestic audience, which ensures that the 
action will have costs if the leadership backs down (Fearon, 1994: 586). In order 
to create costly signals through audience cost Fearon theorized that leaders have 
two mechanisms through which they can affect the costs, either through (1)“tying 
their hands” and committing fully to an dispute which raises the costs, or (2) 
sinking costs through careful de-escalation of the dispute. The mechanisms create 
different kinds of audience costs that occur ex-ante or ex-post the dispute, which 
also sends different signals to opposing actors in the dispute (Fearon, 1997: 70).  
Leaders sometimes want high audience costs because it increases the bargaining 
power in a dispute. The logic behind this argument is that states with high 
audience costs towards the leadership will have more incentive to be firm and 
show resolve towards the other actors in the dispute with lower audience costs, as 
they do not want to incur these costs (Fearon, 1997: 69). Fearon claimed that 
democracies are the states that are most capable of creating high audience costs as 
the mechanisms for accountability and culpability are higher than in an autocracy 
(1994: 587). One important aspect in the creation of audience costs is the 
existence of a free press, as a free press enables the public to gain information 
about an issue without the approval of the leadership. Baum and Potter (2010) go 
so far as to say that leaders can only credibly commit to audience costs when there 
is a free press. Another mechanism of audience costs that is connected to 
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democracy is the existence of a strong political opposition, which in the event of a 
dispute can play the role of a whistle-blower (Baum & Potter, 2014). 
Notwithstanding these findings, are these mechanisms exclusive to states with 
democratic governance? 
This is a question that Chen Weiss asked when she decided to look at how 
China’s leadership has interacted with the public. In a very valuable study of the 
interplay between leaders and the public Chen Weiss (2014) shows how Chinese 
leaders historically have used nationalist protests to bargain and show resolve in 
disputes with other states, especially in disputes with Japan and USA. According 
to Chen Weiss, nationalist protests are both useful and troublesome for an 
authoritarian state, due to the fact that the protests can be difficult to control and 
they can easily turn against the own government. When nationalist protests erupt 
the protesters are in the driver’s seat through their quantity and power, as the 
sentiment they have against other states cannot be quelled by the government. 
However, the government can control, to some extent, the timing of the outbreaks 
of the protests, meaning that they can manage them to fit the government’s 
agenda, which can become a useful instrument for the government (Chen Weiss, 
2014: 3f). Antiforeigner and nationalist protests may have grave consequences, 
both domestically and internationally, as these kinds of protests can trigger 
incidents that create instability, or even a revolution, as was the case in Iran in 
1979 when the security forces sided with the protesters (Chen Weiss, 2014: 21). 
Weiss findings aligns with Baum’s (2004) findings regarding the instrumental 
way political leaders draws attention to issues to create bargaining power toward 
other disputants. Domestic politics and foreign policy is therefore inherently 
connected as audience costs is something the leaders always needs to take into 
consideration when conducting international relations (Baum, 2004: 628f) 
Chen Weiss’ study highlights the dilemma that authoritarian leaders face when 
managing nationalist sentiment – the double-edged sword - but it also shows that 
authoritarian leaders are vulnerable to public culpability in the light of foreign 
policy in a similar manner as democratically elected leaders are as well. Jessica 
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Weeks (2008) strengthens the claim that audience costs also exist in non-
democracies in a study where she statistically correlate regime type with the 
bargaining strength of a state. The hypothesis that Weeks tested predicted that a 
government with higher audience cost, that is accountability and culpability, will 
be more successful in its foreign policy due to the fact that an unwanted outcome 
may result in repercussions for the leadership from the public, resulting in a more 
assertive foreign policy and a stronger bargaining position (Weeks, 2008: 36). 
Weeks found that notion of democracies being more effective in creating more 
audience costs than autocracies are false, as many autocracies, such as one-party 
systems, are susceptible to audience cost to a large extent. The reason for 
scholars’ failure to predict this previously has, according to Weeks, to do with a 
too narrow definition of accountability, which may result in failure to identify 
autocratic audience costs (Weeks, 2008: 59f). Weeks finding aligns with the 
findings of Tomz (2007), who through the use of surveys came to the conclusions 
that audience costs arise from the concerns that the public have about the 
international reputation of their country. Tomz also found that audience costs 
exist in a wide range of conditions, and that audience costs increase together with 
escalation (2007: 836). Consequently, the claim that audience costs are less 
relevant for a an authoritarian regime are therefore to some extent invalid, even 
though the mechanisms for accountability are more blunt in a non-democratic 
state. 
The purpose of this short literature review has been to theoretically situate where 
this study has taken its inspiration from by briefly discussing how domestic 
politics and public opinion influences foreign policy. Audience costs is a 
mechanism that in this literature review has been framed as the main mechanism 
through which domestic politics and public opinion influence foreign policy, even 
though there exist other ways through which it can influence. However, audience 
costs has been highlighted due to the fact that the mechanism is identifiable in 
both democracies and autocracies, which is a relevant finding for this study and 
the theoretical choices that are to be made in it. Furthermore, these theoretical 
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findings about audience costs in autocracies complement the more empirical 
observations from researchers such as Susan Shirk (2014) about the communist 
party in China and what motivations and incentives the communist party has for 
conducting the foreign policy they currently are carrying out. According to Shirk 
the Chinese political system features:  
“A politically insecure leadership that places the highest priority on the survival 
of Chinese Communist Party rule and is intent on preventing large-scale unrest, 
avoiding public schisms in the leadership, and maintaining military loyalty” 
(Shirk, 2014: 3) 
Adding to this, Shirk (2014: 13f) posits that the Chinese leadership is highly 
responsive to nationalist public opinion, which ties into the findings of Chen 
Weiss’ (2014) study of nationalist protests in China and the connection to the 
government. This sensitivity to nationalist sentiment and the political insecurity of 
the Chinese leadership are issues that will be analysed together with the results of 
this study in the analysis section of this thesis.  
2.2 Copenhagen School of Security Studies 
Here follows a brief presentation of Copenhagen School Theory (CST) and the 
most vital aspects of the school of thought’s tenets. In this study the Buzan et al 
(1998) book will be used, as it outlines the theoretical framework of CST. 
Important developments and contributions to CST after 1998 will be discussed in 
the section ‘Discussion’. 
2.2.1 Ontology of security 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CST) is inherently connected to a 
constructivist understanding of epistemology and ontology, which therefore 
naturally will guide the research conducted in this thesis as well. Constructivism’s 
most famous axiom regarding international relations is the notion that “anarchy is 
what states makes of it”, famously coined by Wendt (1992) in what is regarded as 
the first constructivist international relations publication. In his article Wendt 
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questioned the validity of how liberal and realist scholars were concerned with 
how an anarchical system affected the actions of the states in it. Research about 
human nature and agency was being neglected for the benefit of debates in 
international relations concerned with the influence of structures versus process 
on state’s behaviour. Wendt on the other hand argued that even though liberalism 
and realism was seen as opposing theories, they both took the self-interested state 
as given and the starting points for their analysis – which concedes causal power 
to the anarchic structure of the international system (Wendt, 1992: 392). 
However, according to Wendt this causal power is not given, and liberalism and 
realism are both at fault for conceding this. Instead Wendt argues that self-help as 
a feature of anarchy arises not because it is a constitutive feature, but because self-
help has been institutionalised
2
 as a part of the international system through social 
interaction. Wendt describes the process of institutionalization as: “that the 
meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction” (Wendt, 
1992: 403). Consequently, this also affects the constructivist understanding of 
security, which this thesis is intent on looking closer at, as security is a term that 
action is organized out of.  Security dilemmas that arise in an anarchic system are 
not inherently given through the characteristics of the system. Instead Wendt 
insists that security dilemmas are social structures that are formed from 
intersubjective understandings of the world, or, put in another way, they are 
produced through continuous social interactions that have reproduced the 
intersubjectivity (Wendt, 1992: 402). Epistemologically constructivists concede 
that there is a world independent of the human mind, but that knowledge about 
this world is a result of human interaction and social construction (Wendt, 1992: 
399).  
2.2.2 Widening vs. Narrowing 
The founders of CST took inspiration Wendt when they started to develop their 
new take on the concept of security studies, and the ontologies of CST and 
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 Institutionalization is a term that will be further introduced later in this chapter 
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constructivism therefore align. CST challenges other theories about security 
through its conception of security, due to the fact that CST-scholars are not 
necessarily concerned with analysing security in the context of military power, 
but rather they focus on how the concept of security is created through social 
interaction between different actors and agents (Buzan et al, 1998). The concept 
of security is central to CST, and the school of academic thought also first 
emerged when it grew out of a debate about the concept of security. The debate 
about the ‘wide’ versus the ‘narrow’ conception of security developed during the 
end of the Cold War when the dissatisfaction about the explicit focus on military 
and nuclear power in security studies started to be questioned by several scholars 
(see Buzan, 1983). CST sides with the ‘wideners’ of the concept of security, even 
though CST-scholars acknowledge that widening the concept of security too 
much risks exposing security to intellectual incoherence, as extending the concept 
of security too much might undermine the concept altogether (Buzan et al 1998: 
4). Furthermore, security is not always a favourable mode of analysis, as 
“[s]ecurity should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing” (Buzan et 
al, 1998: 4). Instead they argue that the agenda of security should be contained to 
the realm of existential threats, but to argue that the only relevant security issues 
are war and force, and issues that become relevant in the light of war and force, is 
a too narrow understanding of security which neglects the analytical benefits of a 
wider conceptualization (Buzan et al 1998: 4). 
One of the scholars who pioneered the ‘widening’ of security studies was Barry 
Buzan, later one of the founders to CST, who wrote the very influential book 
“People, States and Fear” (1983), in which Buzan attempts to reconceptualise how 
we understand and apply the concept of security. Buzan’s central theme in the 
book is that security is an extremely versatile concept through which we can 
understand how states and societies act in the light of threats and vulnerabilities. 
Instead of having a ‘narrow’ view of security, where military power is the only 
relevant factor, Buzan pioneered using a ‘wider’ concept of security where sectors 
are used to identify specific types of interactions regarding security. Buzan 
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showed how a sectorial analysis could be used as a framework for understanding 
how freedom from threat is pursued in the political, economic, military, societal 
and environmental sectors (Buzan, 1983). Sectorial analysis is an essential part of 
CST and will also play a big part in the analysis of Chinese assertiveness in the 
South China Sea, as the sectorial analysis can help this thesis to add new insights 
to China’s actions in the area.  
2.2.3 Sectors 
A broadened understanding of security is essential to CST as the school of 
thought is interested in looking at how security concerns are institutionalised and 
made into collective knowledge. However, why is the sectorial analysis relevant 
for this purpose? A broadened security perspective means that the same concept is 
applied to contexts that it usually not is applied too which may differ much in 
their attributes. The sectorial, or disaggregated, analysis in CST is therefore used 
to make it easier to identify and work with different agendas, values and 
discourses that are unique to the different sectors (Buzan et al, 1998: 27). For the 
disaggregated analysis to be analytically significant the different sectors need to 
be analytically independent from each other, or else the validity becomes 
questionable if for example all of the sectors only can be analysed in their 
relationship to military security. Buzan et al argues that this is not a problem as 
the different sectors analyse distinctive patterns of interaction, which neatly 
confines the scope of inquiry, drastically reducing the amount of variables at play 
(1998: 8). However, the ultimate goal of the disaggregated analysis is to create a 
cross-sectoral understanding of security dynamics as the pieces are put back 
together to create a bigger picture, which the sectorial analysis is a good tool for. 
The reason for this being that dissecting security through the lenses of different 
sectors the concept of security becomes more transparent and the instrumental 
part of its creation becomes more distinguishable (Buzan et al, 1998: 167). 
CST acknowledges five different sectors where there exist different patterns of 
interaction concerning security. These are: 
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 Military 
 Political 
 Economic 
 Societal 
 Environmental 
The military sector is the sector that best aligns with a narrow definition of 
security, as the dynamics in this sector mostly concerns issues about relative 
power and sovereignty. Issues about military security mostly arise out of the 
process of governance and questions about political legitimacy. Sovereignty is the 
principle that is the most important aspect for a government, and the military 
security agenda primarily concerns the government’s ability to stay at power at 
the threat of both internal and external forces (Buzan et al, 1998: 49f). 
Securitization of external threats in the military sector can be seen as a two-level 
game, wherein there are two main attributes that are important. Firstly, the 
offensive and defensive capabilities are of interest, but perhaps more important 
are the perceptions of each other’s capabilities and intentions (Buzan et al¸1998: 
51). 
The political sector aligns with the military sector in many regards, as both 
sectors concern the organisational stability of social orders. However, they differ 
in the fact that the political sector pays attention to non-military threats to 
sovereignty and social structures. The political sector also concerns other referent 
objects than large communalities, such as states, as human rights and international 
law can be securitized. Generally, political ‘threats’ are about giving or denying 
recognition, support or legitimacy to a political unit. These ‘threats’ can be both 
internal, within the unit, and external, outside of the unit, which may have 
different consequences (Buzan et al, 1998: 144).  
In an increasingly globalised world economy where we are becoming more and 
more interconnected there exists both winners and losers, we are increasingly 
becoming more and more dependent on networks of economy and international 
trade for all levels of economy to function. There exists great vulnerabilities and 
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threats in the economic sector, which the 2008 economic crises showcased to the 
world. Furthermore, economic security ties into other sectors, as the liberal world 
order has created a great dependency on trade and money transactions for states to 
function (Buzan et al, 1998: 115f).  
A communality that often is neglected as a unit of analysis in international 
relations is the nation, which of course has to do with the fact that nations and 
states align to a large extent. Societal security differs from political security 
because they are concerned with different aspects of society. Political security, as 
mentioned above, is concerned with the organisational stability of a government 
and the legitimacy that this implies. In the societal sector the organisational 
concept is identity instead of the state. What is threatened in the societal sector is 
therefore the identity or nation, which often turns into a discussion about the 
increased vulnerability of a identity’s ‘way of living’, which can become 
threatened by for example migration or competition (Buzan et al, 1998: 121).  
Finally, environmental security is concerned with the issue of environmental 
degradation and the impact that human activity has on the biosphere. The main 
referent object in this sector is the environment, even though it can be argued that 
environmental degradation affect other referent objects through the consequences 
of for example global warming (Buzan et al, 1998: 75-77) 
2.2.4 Securitisation 
The word security is in itself a word that has a wide range of uses and definitions. 
However, in the realm international relations the term security threat is most often 
used to describe a phenomenon that is a threat to a referent object, which entitles 
the use of emergency measures to protect the referent object (Buzan et al, 1998: 
24-27). In the traditional military-political conception of security the term alludes 
to a state’s intention of survival and the extraordinary methods that this entitles. 
The nuclear doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is in this 
conception of security a measure which attempts to ensure the survival of the state 
through the destructive power of nuclear weapons (PNAPF, 2017). However, due 
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to CST using a wider conception of security than the traditional conception a 
different definition of a security threat is necessary. First of all, in CST the 
referent object does not necessarily have to be a state or a nation, it can instead be 
all types of entity - from a supranational organisation like the EU to an individual 
person. Thus, what makes a phenomenon a security threat is not the scale of it. 
Nor does there exist actual ‘positivist’ security threats in the world that you can 
go out in the world to observe and measure (Buzan et al, 1998: 21f). A tank is 
therefore not a security threat in itself; it only becomes a security threat when the 
intersubjective understanding of the reasons for its existence dictates it. Rather, 
what makes a phenomenon or an issue a ‘security threat’ “can only be understood 
in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question” (Buzan et 
al, 1998: 21). Consequently, what this means is that security threats should 
therefore always be understood in context of what it is threatening – the referent 
object – as this allows the researcher to look closer at the distinctive patterns of 
interaction that arises in this interplay (Buzan et al,1998: 22f).  
At the heart of CST is the process of securitisation, which is a conceptualization 
of how security threats are constructed in the social interaction between different 
actors. Buzan et al writes that: 
“’Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” 
(1998: 23) 
To contextualise the act of securitisation it can be helpful to view the importance 
of an issue as a spectrum where securitisation can be placed at the end of a 
spectrum detailing the urgency and importance of an issue, meaning a securitized 
issue requires or justifies extraordinary measures. At the other end of the spectrum 
are the non-politicised issues, while politicised issues can be found in the middle 
of the spectrum. A politicised issue can to some extent be seen as a precursor to 
securitisation as politicisation is the process of bringing an issue into public 
attention or into the realm of policy (Buzan, 1998: 23f). The opposite action to 
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securitisation is the process of de-securitisation, which involves moving an issue 
away from the realm of security (Hansen, 2012). 
For a phenomenon to become securitised an actor has to label and present an issue 
as an existential threat to another actor, entity or object, which in CST is known as 
the referent object. The traditional understanding of a referent object in security is 
the state, or other forms of entities that have the potential to entice collective 
feelings, such as nations, religions or ‘civilisations’. Scale necessarily plays a part 
here as collectivities that can have a form of adversary have a greater chance of 
becoming a referent object, which disfavours both smaller and larger referent 
objects (Buzan et al, 1998: 36f). It is therefore more likely that a state or regime 
becomes a referent object than for example the ‘Western world’. The actor who 
labels an issue an existential threat, and therefore performs a securitising move, is 
called the securitising actor and is most commonly an actor such as a political 
leader, a lobbyist or a government. The referent object and the securitizing actor 
are generally not the same actor, as it is uncommon for an actor to be able to 
legitimately speak about existential threats to its own survival (Buzan et al, 1998: 
36-39). A problem of agency may arise in this context as identifying the actors of 
a securitisation move can become somewhat contradictory, which is due to the 
fact that actors can have different forms of agency. As have been mentioned in the 
examples above a government could securitise an issue concerning the state it is 
the government, which seems contradictory as the government and the state can 
be considered as the same actor. However, an actor can have different types of 
agency and can have different roles (Buzan et al, 1998: 40). What is needed to 
identify the correct securitizing actor is therefore a level-of-analysis perspective of 
agency. For example, a president can to some extent be representative of a state, a 
government, a political party, a bureaucracy, an interest group or herself as an 
individual. Notwithstanding, to not complicate this process of identifying the 
securitising actor is preferable. According to Buzan et al the best way of 
identifying the role of the securitizing actor is to focus on the organisational logic 
of a securitizing move through the process of trying to identify in what 
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organisational context a speech act is conducted in (1998:41). The final actors of 
the process of securitisation are functional actors, who are actors that affect the 
dynamics of a sector, but whom are not the referent object nor the securitising 
actor (Buzan et al, 1998:36). 
Securitisation is a speech act, meaning that different phenomena can be labelled 
as an existential threat to a referent object through the speech/writing - or rather 
the discourse - of a securitising actor (Buzan et al, 1998). For an issue to become 
securitised it furthermore needs to become institutionalised. Wendt describes this 
process as: “a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something 
occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive 
process, not just a behavioral one” (Wendt, 1992:399). Consequently, for a speech 
act to render a securitisation it needs to be socialised and accepted by an audience. 
The significant audience is the collectivity that the securitizing act attempts to 
persuade that extraordinary measures are needed to address an issue, due to it 
existentially threatening the referent object (Buzan et al, 1998: 41). In the CST-
framework the process of acceptance is left relatively undefined and no 
‘mechanisms’ of acceptance are discussed, giving the researcher a lot of leeway 
for interpretation. Juha Vouri’s (2008) research on securitisation in non-
democratic states here becomes valuable as it looks closer at how securitisation-
studies can help us learn more about politics in a non-democratic state. Vouri 
argues that even though Chinese politics is very secretive and closed to the 
‘masses’ the leaders still have the need and urge to appeal to the public for 
support. Security dynamics in this context becomes a powerful way of building 
and maintaining bonds with the public as the language of ‘security’ signifies order 
and control, which can be contrasted against the ‘insecurity’ and ‘chaos’ that 
China experienced during the first part of the 20
th
 century (Vouri, 2008: 71). 
Thus, even though there are no democratic mechanisms in China there exists 
social interaction between leaders, the public and other actors such as elites, 
especially in the realm of security, which is very relevant for securitisation. The 
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methodological side of securitisation theory will be discussed further in the 
methods section.  
2.3. Discussion 
The ontology and the consequent definition of the concept of security that 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies advocates has large implications for how 
the researcher approaches the topics of international relations and security.  Bill 
McSweeney, one of the starkest critics of CST, has long argued that the concept 
of having socially constructed entities as the referent object in a security analysis 
is fundamentally flawed. One of McSweeney’s biggest points of critique is 
putting ‘society’ and the state as equally valid referent objects in the framework, 
making ‘identity’ and ‘society’ potential threats to the state (McSweeney, 1998). 
Furthermore, another valid critique towards CST concerns the fact that the 
researcher is forced to create her own definition of vital terms such as ‘identity’ 
and ‘society’ for the security analysis to be possible. This puts a lot of emphasis 
on the researchers’ objectivity, calling into question the validity of collective 
identities as the basis for analysis (McSweeney, 1996: 90f). However, it is 
possible to avoid this potential pitfall of subjectivity through CST’s application of 
constructivism, which in many ways is not as extreme as for example it is in 
Critical Security Studies, which sees the social structures of the world as 
constantly changing (Buzan et al, 1998: 204f). CST on the other hand has a 
constructivist outlook on the world, but it stresses the fact that the socially 
constituted reality becomes so sedimented as structures and practices that analysis 
must be conducted with the assumption that it will continue to exist. The social 
construction of security here plays a part as it enables the researcher to not only 
criticize these socially constituted facts, but it also enables the researcher to 
understand the dynamics of security in the context of these stable structures. This, 
according to Buzan et al, leads to a stronger emphasis on collectivities in their 
framework and on understanding what issues that trigger securitization in order to 
avoid changes to these structures and practices (1998: 34f). What this means for 
the researcher using CST is that too much emphasis should not be put on 
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analysing the actual agency of the referent object or other actors in the 
securitization analysis, as this should be inherently unproblematic. 
Another point of critique directed towards CST concerns the issue of if it is 
possible to capture complicated security dynamics through the simple process of 
speaker-audience interaction. Salter and Piché have for example shown that CST 
fails to capture security dynamics that are produced at a grass root-level, as CST 
has a top-down approach to security the creation of security (Salter & Piché, 
2011). This critique toward CST will be taken into account during the analysis of 
the results of this thesis. Furthermore, the literature review conducted on the issue 
of audience costs will in many ways help this thesis add another layer to the 
securitisation analysis that will be conducted on China. In CST the audience has a 
relatively passive role where its main function is to accept or decline the 
securitizing actors attempt to make a securitizing move. However, with the 
addition of the concept of audience cost to the analysis the audience becomes a 
much more important actor for the analysis. As was discussed in the literature 
review autocratic regimes are not necessarily immune to audience costs and there 
exist several mechanisms through which accountability for actions can be 
demanded, which also will be assumed in this thesis. What this concretely means 
is that the securitization analysis will also be analysed in the context of audience 
costs in autocratic regimes, giving the audience a more prudent role in the 
analysis. 
The expansion to a wider security agenda should not be seen as an end goal in 
itself. The pursuit of a wider agenda is the result of the need to deepen the 
understanding of how security dynamics emerge and evolve. In many ways CST 
is concerned with finding and separating politicised from securitized issues, as 
this differentiation will help us understand how relations are structured and the 
dynamics of these structures. Security is when it all comes down to it a quality 
that an actor adds to an issue. In the context of China these theoretical 
assumptions might produce a very interesting study as the possible referent object 
are many and it is not given which collectivities are actors in the states politics. 
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Finally, an important development concerning CST that will be taken into account 
during this thesis is the work by Thierry Balzacq (2005) in which he challenges 
the CST-framework. Balzacq’s main point of critique is that the discursive 
element in the framework is conceptualised in a very formal and rigid way. The 
result of this is that the speech act of the securitisation almost becomes codified 
and formalised, reducing security to a conventional procedure (Balzacq, 2005: 
172). Balzacq instead proposes the approach of seeing securitisation as a more 
discursive practice that has a stark strategic aspect to it, in order to move away 
from a linguistically rule-based understanding of securitisation;  
“securitization should be understood as a strategic (or a pragmatic) practice, as 
opposed to one of universal pragmatics (speech act), the aim of which is to 
determine the universal principles of an effective communicative action of 
security” (Balzacq, 2005: 191). 
Further, Balzacq posits “(i) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; 
(ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective securitization is 
power-laden” (Balzacq, 2005: 171). With reference to Balsacq’s critique towards 
CST this thesis securitisation will not be seen as a self-contained process that 
occurs in a vacuum, but rather be viewed as a complex process with many moving 
parts that affect its effectiveness. This is also something that Curley and 
Herington (2011: 145) found is a better approach to securitisation studies in East 
Asia as this allows for different forms of relationships between the audience and 
the securitising actor. 
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3. Method 
The thesis is theory-using case-study in its outset, as it will evaluate if 
securitization theory and a broadened security concept can give a robust 
explanation of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. However, the thesis 
will also have a theory-testing aspect as CST-studies of non-European states are 
relatively unusual. The aspect of audience costs will in this study not be seen as a 
competing explanation for the phenomenon that will be studied, rather the concept 
of audience costs will be seen as a complementing explanation that will help the 
study create a more robust explanation of the observations of China’s more 
assertive foreign policy. The purpose of the study is not to develop theory, but to 
use it to explain how security dynamics are produced in the context of the South 
China Sea. The case has been chosen due to its specific nature, and it therefore not 
been chosen due to its properties in the context of the theory.  
The study will be inherently qualitative in its method as the purpose of the thesis 
is to learn more about how the socially constituted is created and how social 
practices shapes the world. A qualitative approach is not the only valid approach, 
however a qualitative approach has been chosen as the thesis intends to explore 
how issues are given the quality of a ‘security threat’ through the act of speech or 
writing. To be able to identify the act of securitisation it is necessary to analyse 
the content and discourse of a speech act, as the meaning of the concept lies in the 
usage, and not what people ‘think’ the concept means (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). For 
this reason a quantitative approach is not suitable as a method for studying 
securitisation, even though a quantitative textual-analysis is an alternative method 
for this type of study. Instead a qualitative method will be used that will enable 
the study to observe the social interactions that create security dynamics. The 
thesis will consequently also be deductive in its approach as the thesis accepts 
CST’s theory of how social interaction forms the world and how security 
dynamics are produced in this context which will guide the research. 
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3.1 Application of the Copenhagen School framework  
Securitisation is a process that involves a set of actors and a predetermined timing 
for a set of events to occur, in order for an issue to become securitised. It therefore 
exists a certain logic to how a researcher can go about to study this process. The 
first and most important action of the securitisation of an issue is the actual 
securitisation move that the securitizing actor conducts. The securitization move 
is a speech act or a written text which imposes the quality of ‘security threat’ upon 
an issue. This securitization move is observable through textual analysis of for 
example speeches, documents and articles, where the researcher tries to find how 
an issue is elevated from the realm of ‘normal politics’ as it is presented as an 
existential threat to a referent object. However, for an issue to become securitised 
it also needs to become accepted by an audience within the unit that is regarded as 
the referent object for security. A securitisation move can never be imposed on 
the audience, instead the acceptance is dependent on the relationship between 
coercion and consent that exist within the unit of analysis. The social interaction 
between the securitising actor and the audience is important for the process of 
securitisation as it creates a platform from which it is possible to legitimize 
extraordinary measures in reference to the securitized issue (Buzan et al, 1998: 
24f). The ‘acceptance’ of the audience of the securitising move is the second 
action where the researcher can observe the process of securitization. It is this 
process of securitisation that leads to the situation where it is legitimate for an 
actor to ‘break the rules’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 24f). It is also this apparent 
legitimization of China breaking international rules and norms in the South China 
Sea that this thesis wants to study in order to uncover underlying China’s 
intentions and motivations for its actions. 
In the case of China the aspect of an audience accepting a securitisation is 
interesting as the relationship between coercion and consent should lean towards 
more towards coercion, due to the fact that China is a one-party state. However, as 
was discussed in the literature review and in the theory section, audiences in 
autocracies can have greater agency in international relations than is often 
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assumed in literature, which can call into question this assumption. Vouri’s (2008) 
research on securitization in China also supports the claim that audience costs are 
an important aspect of security dynamics in non-democratic states. 
Notwithstanding this insight about audience costs in autocracies - the acceptance 
of a securitisation move and audience costs are not necessarily the same 
phenomenon. This is due to the fact that the mechanisms for an audience to 
decline a securitisation move in an autocracy are fewer than they are in a 
democracy. The limitation on mechanisms such as free-speech and political 
freedom in autocracies should naturally make it harder for an audience to incite 
debate and question the actions of the securitising actor. The mechanisms through 
which audience costs can affect the actions of the government is on the other hand 
stronger, as was discussed in the literature review, due to the fact that audience 
costs in one-party states are mostly created in the context of nationalist protests or 
by elites (Chen Weiss, 2014). As Curley and Herington (2011) found in a study of 
securitisation in South East Asia CST is not easily applicable to non-democratic 
states, as it is modelled after a modern European, liberal and Westphalian 
understanding of a state, which to some extent gives the CST-framework 
conceptual restrictions. Thus, the audience in a non-democratic state does not 
necessarily have to be the public, as who is the relevant audience is dependent on 
the social structures of the society, meaning that the significant audience for an 
securitization can be for example political elites or military leadership (Vouri, 
2008; Curley & Herington, 2011: 164f). Consequently, the relationship between 
the ‘audience’ and the securitising actor will be seen as negotiated stabile social 
structures that are not challenged by the public. Instead the relevant audience for a 
securitisation move in a Chinese context will in this study be political, military 
and economic elites within China. This conclusion is supported by studies of 
Chinese political structures where political and economic elites enjoy significant 
agency over state policy (see for example; Zhengxu & Jinghan, 2016; Dongya & 
Chuanmin, 2016; Cheng, 2006; Zhou, 2001) Instead emphasis will be put on the 
process of conducting a securitising move and the political effect/context of this 
act, which will enable the thesis to focus on analysing underlying intentions and 
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motivations for actions in the light of the dispute in the South China Sea. This 
limitation in the studies scope also has to do with the limitation in time and space 
for the execution of the thesis. 
3.2 Technique 
 
The main method used will be textual analysis, due to the importance of speech 
and discourse in the process of securitisation. The process that the textual analysis 
will be looking for is the speech act where an issue is elevated from a normal 
political issue to an issue of security. The exact definition and criteria of 
securitisation is “constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential 
threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al, 
1998: 25). According to Buzan et al securitisation can therefore be studied 
directly, and therefore does not need indicators to be identified; rather the way to 
study securitisation is to study discourse and political constellations (1998: 25). 
The suitable textual analysis technique that suits this definition of securitisation is 
discourse analysis, as this technique allows the researcher to study how social 
practices and structures relate to the use of language (Bergström & Boréus, 
2012:23). 
3.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
There exists a myriad of different renditions of discourse analysis techniques, 
much due to the increasing popularity of discourse analysis as a method for 
uncovering structures of power that underlie social interaction. There 
consequently also exists many different ways of analysing discourse, which often 
is dependent on the theory of science that the discourse analysis theory builds 
upon (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 353-355). An example of differing directions 
within discourse analysis is the Foucauldian discourse analysis, which is 
influenced by post-structuralism. Foucauldian discourse analysis is primarily 
concerned with how power relations are formed in the interaction between people 
and how this creates limitations and possibilities for different actors. Foucauldian 
discourse analysis also puts a lot of emphasis on the relationship between and 
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within discourses, known as inter- and intradiscourse relationships, and how these 
relationships are subjected to change over the course of time (Bergström & 
Boréus, 2012: 361ff). With regard to securitisation and for the purpose of this 
thesis another form of discourse analysis will be applied that better aligns with 
how CST stipulates that security dynamics are constructed, which will be Critical 
Discourse Analysis. 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a collection of approaches to discourse 
analysis that is concerned with exposing veiled power structures that exists in 
society which are reproduced through the use of discourse, which is what CDA is 
critical towards (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 374). The CDA-approach that has 
been chosen for this study is Norman Fairclough’s approach, which also is known 
as Dialectical-Relational Approach. The Dialectical-Relational Approach views 
semiosis, the act of meaning-making, as an essential irreducible part of all 
material social processes. According to Fairclough “[w]e can see social life as 
interconnected networks of social practices of diverse sorts (economic, political, 
cultural, and so on). And every practice has a semiotic element” (Fairclough, 
2001: 122). CDA in Fairclough’s approach mainly aims to analyse the 
relationship between semiosis and other elements of social practice (Fairclough, 
2001: 123), which aligns very well with how CST views how the process of 
securitization produces social relations as securitization is a form of semiosis.  
Fairclough’s Dialectical-Relational Approach views discourse as having three 
distinct functions: a content dimension, a relational function and an identity 
creating function. This understanding of discourse enables the researcher to 
analyse a text with the help from a model that has three different levels of 
analysis. This model for analysing discourse has been adapted to align with the 
theoretical framework and purpose of this thesis: 
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 Content dimension – The text: The first level of analysis is the text itself. 
The focus of this level is generally on the linguistic features of the text, as 
the way language is written/spoken can say a lot about what is not said 
(Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 376). The first level in this study will 
primarily study the use of security language and the actual linguistic 
framing of an issue as an existential threat to a referent object, the so 
called securitization move. However, as securitisation can be done through 
more discrete wordings and meanings attention will be put on finding 
ways in which language is used to convey an issue as a matter of security. 
What is said explicitly and what is said implicitly? 
Questions:  
How is the South China Sea dispute described in the documents? 
How is language used to convey the importance of an issue? 
 Relational function - Discursive practice: The second level of analysis is 
the discursive practice, which concerns the production, distribution and 
consumption of the text. At this level the framing and discourses 
concerning the China’s description of their security and security concerns 
will be analyses, to see if there exist similarities in the discourses used in 
the different documents. An important factor at this level is the so called 
‘intertextuality’ between different text, which is the extent to which 
discourses align through different texts (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 376). 
Question: 
What discourses are prevalent in the analysed documents? 
 Identity creating function – Social practice: The third level of analysis 
puts the discourse in a wider social context. It is at this level that the 
analysis studies how the text and the social practices that come with it fits 
into wider structures of power. At this level it is also necessary to study 
how the discourse relates to other discourses that are active in the same 
area (Bergström & Boréus, 2012: 377). The relationships between the 
different actors in a securitization process and their agency will be 
analysed. 
Questions: 
Which units are the referent objects of security in the analysed 
documents? 
Which social dynamics and relations are discernible in the analysed 
documents? 
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3.2.2 Example of Security discourse 
The Critical Discourse Analysis will be employed for the purpose of finding the 
process of securitisation. With reference to clarity of how the process 
securitisation can look like an example of a securitization move will follow 
below. The quote that follows is a statement by the Vietnamese government in 
reference to the outbreak of the “Avian Flu” in 2005 and was used as an example 
of a securitisation move in a study by Curley and Herington (2011):  
“The formulation and implementation of such urgent action plans (against bird 
flu) must be considered an unexpected and urgent task of Party committees and 
administrations of all levels and a duty of each citizen and, therefore, the strength 
of the whole political system should be mobilized for this task [. . .] To take 
initiative in making all necessary preparations and mobilizing every resource to 
prevent and combat the type-A (H5N1)influenza among humans [. . .] the Ministry 
of Health, concerned ministries and branches and localities shall guide all 
medical units and establishments (even the army and police forces) from the 
central to provincial, municipal, district and communal levels” (Government of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2005) 
From the perspective of securitisation what can be understood by this statement is 
that the government is trying to gain acceptance from an audience to use 
extraordinary measures, in this case the mobilisation of army and police forces, in 
order to combat the avian flu. A discourse that is discernible from the almost war-
like statement is the discourse of mobilisation, which is needed to combat at 
external threat to Vietnam as a society (Curley & Herington, 2011: 154). 
Consequently what is done through this statement is the reconstruction of the 
avian flu from the realm of political issues to the realm of security issues that 
poses a threat to the Vietnamese society. As health issues are not seen as 
‘traditional’ security issues, this statement shows how security dynamics are 
created in social interaction. 
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3.3 Material 
The material that will be used in the critical discourse analysis is both official 
governmental publications and official statements by China. The main 
publications that are used are the defence white papers released by the Chinese 
government in 2011, 2013 and 2015. Other documents that are used are official 
statements and position papers from the last three years on the South China Sea 
issue. The data collected for the study will only be English-language documents, 
which to some extent is problematic as it becomes harder to identify domestic 
dynamics of social interaction. This aspect is discussed further later in this 
chapter. 
3.3.1 White papers 
White Papers are reports or guides from a government that aim to inform the 
audience about a complex issue and the position of the government regarding it. 
The purpose of White Papers is to create understanding for the reader, which for 
example can help the reader to make a decision or solve a problem (Zhang, 2012). 
China has since 1998 released defence related white papers every second year 
without exemption, which have addressed issues concerning the national defence 
of the Peoples Republic of China such as defence policies and nuclear 
disarmament. In academia Chinese white papers have been dismissed as lacking 
substance and having little tangible information about Chinese defence policies 
and strategies. However, Jiang Zhan (2012) has pointed out the role that the white 
papers play in China’s communication with its neighbours, but also the role that 
they play domestically in shaping public opinions and generating public support 
for the Peoples Liberation Army. China’s defence white paper released in 2011, 
2013 and 2015 is therefore used to collect data on securitisation for the study. The 
defence white papers are in this study regarded as being a product of the 
Communist Party in China. 
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3.3.3 Language restrictions 
The material that will be studied in this thesis will be English-language 
documents publicised by the Chinese government, due to the author’s lack of 
proficiency in Mandarin. It is somewhat problematic to ensure validity and 
reliability of the research when the social interaction between agents cannot be 
studied in the relevant language. This is especially problematic as the research is 
qualitative and will use discourse analysis to study how security dynamics are 
formed through the creation of discourse. However, it is the position of this thesis 
that the English-language material can produce reliable and valid research due to 
several reasons. Firstly, the Chinese government has little incentive for their 
English-language documents to use different discourses and have different content 
than their domestic-language documents, it will however be acknowledged that 
the English-language documents will be more directed towards an international 
audience than their counterparts. Notwithstanding, if the government intends to 
securitise an issue concerning the South China Sea it most likely also wants to 
communicate this to other states active in the dispute, and these other states can be 
seen as functional actors in the securitisation. A functional actor is an actor that 
affects the security dynamics of a sector, but who is not part of the securitization 
move itself. Consequently, the English-language material will in this thesis be 
seen as a way to communicate with other actors affected by the securitization 
(Buzan et al, 1998: 56). 
Secondly, as discussed above, the significant audience for the securitisation in 
China is not necessarily the general public. Instead the significant audience is 
most likely elites within the communist party and the economic elites, which to a 
high extent are proficient in English (Bolton & Botha, 2015). The English-
language documents can therefore be seen as a way for the government and other 
actors to communicate with elites that speak English, a possible significant 
audience, and with international actors, which can be seen as functional actors. 
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4. Background 
The South China Sea is a marginal sea to the Pacific Ocean that almost forms an 
internal lake between the South East Asian countries and China through its unique 
properties and geography. All of ASEAN’s member states have a coastline 
towards the South China Sea, making the ocean both a possible source for conflict 
and cooperation for the regional organisation (Kaplan, 2016). The archipelagos of 
the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal have during the 21st 
century become synonymous with territorial contestation as the small islands, 
atolls and reefs have become the arena for world politics thanks to their strategic 
location (Kaplan, 2016). Following the end of the Second World War and the 
retreat of Japanese forces in South East Asia China, Vietnam and the Philippines 
started to claim sovereignty over islands in the region which previously had not 
been of interest for any other state (CFR, 2017). This development was 
accelerated during the 1970s when large oil and gas deposits where located under 
the seabed of the relatively shallow ocean, which spurred minor outbreaks of 
violence between mostly China and Vietnam regarding control of strategically 
located islands (CFR, 2017). Following the introduction of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1994 more states in the region 
has claimed sovereignty over islands and atolls in the South China Sea, resulting 
in many different overlapping lines of territorial claims in the region (BBC, 
2016).     
Since 2010 Chinese assertiveness towards other claimants in the region has risen 
markedly resulting in an increase in outbreaks of violence between actors in the 
region (CFR, 2017). China claims that they have sovereignty over a large portion 
of the South China Sea with reference to the map known as the “Nine-Dash 
Line”-map, which was first published in 1947 and outlines China’s ‘historic 
rights’ in the region (FMPRC, 2016). China claims that they have sovereign rights 
over the South China Sea and the islands on the grounds that “[b]ased on the 
practice of the Chinese people and the Chinese government in the long course of 
history and the position consistently upheld by successive Chinese governments” 
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(FMPRC, 2016). China furthermore claim that the small islands, atolls and reefs 
in the South China Sea, that they claim sovereignty over, can be used as a baseline 
for deciding territorial waters and exclusive economic zones according to 
UNCLOS. However, this claim was overruled by the International Arbitral 
Tribunal in The Hague in July 2016 in the much anticipated case between China 
and the Philippines as the court ruled in the favour of the Philippines (PCA, 
2016). Little has changed regarding the dynamics and positions of the actors in 
the aftermath of the court’s award (see time-line below), which indicates the fact 
that the dispute will have to be solved bilaterally between the different claimants.   
 
Map showing the South China Sea and the disputed areas of the Paracel Islands, 
Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. Red: China’s claimed “Nine-Dash Line”. 
Blue: territory according to UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone (BBC, 2016). 
 
The South China Sea dispute can in many regards be conceptualised as a low-
intensity intrastate conflict that shares many properties with the dispute about 
sovereignty over the Arctic region. There have been few outbreaks of deadly 
violence between the claimants, even though it has occurred (CFR, 2017). Instead 
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the dispute has been characterised by military build-up, land-grabbing and what 
can be described as hybrid-war tactics (Kaplan, 2016). China has for example 
since 2010 started to employ the Chinese coast guard to deter fishermen from 
other states to access areas in the South China Sea (Torode, 2017). There has also 
been reports of China paying and arming their commercial fishing fleet in order to 
act as a proxy for the Chinese coast guard in the region, which is a similar strategy 
to that used by Russia in the Ukraine since 2014 (Erickson & Kennedy, 2015). 
Furthermore, China has also initiated large land-recovery projects on disputed 
reefs and atolls in the region in order to construct military bases and runways for 
aircraft, which is rapidly increasing China’s force projection capacity in the 
surrounding area (Shugart, 2016). Other strong actors in the dispute that are not 
claimants are USA, Australia, Japan and India, who all regularly perform 
‘Freedom of navigation’- operations in the area to uphold international norms and 
law in the region – which China generally sees as provocation (Nguyen, 2016: 
392ff). Tensions between China and USA regarding the dispute have been 
growing since China’s increasing assertiveness in the region (Kaplan, 2016). 
4.1 Time-line of dispute 
Here follows a short time-line of the main events of the South China Sea dispute 
(time-line from: Dancel, 2016)  
May, 2009: China submits the “Nine dash-line” document to the United Nations, 
claiming sovereignty over the South China Sea. 
April, 2012: The Philippine Navy forcefully intercept eight Chinese fishing 
vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal which have been fishing in the area 
illegally, resulting in a two-month stand-off with the Chinese Coast Guard. 
June, 2012: China takes control of Scarborough Shoal. 
January, 2013: The Philippines ask the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 
The Hague to make a ruling on how UNCLOS is supposed to be implemented. 
August, 2013: China states that it will not accept the arbitration by the PCA. 
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February, 2015: China starts five major land-reclamation projects on atolls in the 
South China Sea. 
June, 2015: China states that the land-reclamation projects are almost done.  
October, 2015: The USA conducts a ‘freedom of navigation-operation’ very 
close to China’s newly constructed islands. 
January, 2016: USA conducts a new ‘freedom of navigation-operation’. 
February, 2016: China deploys fighter aircrafts and surface-to-air missiles on 
contested islands. 
June, 2016: USA sails an aircraft-carrier group through the South China Sea. 
July, 2016: China conducts a large military drill in contested area. 
July, 2016: The PCA delivers the ruling in favour of the Philippines. 
4.2 Strategic importance 
The South China Sea’s unique geographic properties make it important in many 
ways. Firstly, half of the world’s merchant fleet’s tonnage and a third of all ships 
passes through the areas annually and through the choke points of the Malacca, 
Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits, which connects the South China Sea with 
the Indian Ocean (BBC, 2016).The South China Sea also connects the rich oil 
field of the Middle East with the East Asian ‘tiger economies’ and is a vital part 
of the global economy. For example, it is estimated that 80% of China’s crude oil 
imports is transported through the South China Sea. This means that this small 
ocean is an important transportation route for energy, unfinished goods and 
finished goods (Kaplan, 2016). 
Secondly, it is proven that the South China Sea contains oil reserves numbering 
seven billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, however Chinese 
estimates suggests that the area can contain as much as 130 billion barrels of oil, 
making it second only to the Middle East in potential oil output (Kaplan, 2016). If 
these estimates are true then East Asia will relieve itself of the dependency of oil 
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imports from the Middle East, which represent a great vulnerability due to the 
relative ease that these shipments can be stopped.  
Thirdly, the South China Sea’s unique biodiversity is good breeding ground for a 
vast range of fish species as it is home to over 3000 different migratory and 
indigenous species of fish. Fishing in the South China Sea comprises some 12% 
of the global fish catch (Greer, 2016). The fish stocks in the region are however 
threatened by over-fishing and the death of the important coral reefs. It is 
estimated that the fish stocks have fallen with up to 95% since the levels of the 
1950s, and may continue falling an additional 59% of 2015 levels if the 
unregulated fishing continues (Moss, 2015). 
Lastly, the area is important from a military perspective, both due to its vastness 
and the many states that surround it, but also in the context of hurting other states 
shipments of energy and other goods. Southeast Asia is the region in the world 
with the greatest increase in arms spending which is fuelled by the economic 
growth that the region has been able to generate (SIPRI, 2016). The countries in 
Southeast Asia are generally caught in a situation where they either are in the 
Chinese or American sphere of influence concerning military relations, or they are 
trying to hedge between the two spheres of influence (Burgess, 2016). 
4.3 Political developments in China 
In April 2010 articles started to publish information regarding Chinese officials 
stating in a meeting with US political representatives that the South China Sea 
was a ‘core interest, on par with Tibet and Taiwan’ of China (Johnston, 2013: 17). 
The story was never fully corroborated nor confirmed by China, notwithstanding 
this came to affect the regional political dynamics of the South China Sea as this 
story and discourse through reproduction in global media came to be regarded as 
truth by other actors in the region, such as USA and other Southeast Asian 
countries (Johnston, 2013: 19). During this period China was at the end of 
president Hu Jintao’s administration, which came to last from 2002 until 2012 
(Buhi, 2014: 241). China under Hu’s administration came to become an economic 
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heavy-weight with the potential to challenge other major powers on the global 
scene. However, Hu throughout his presidency emphasised the doctrine of 
‘peaceful development’ which came to be a catchword for his administration, as it 
was a reoccurring theme in communiqués from his administration along with his 
other policies of ‘Scientific development outlook’ and ‘Socialist harmonious 
Society’ (Buhi, 2014: 261f). Hu’s presidency ended in 2012 when Hu’s previous 
vice-president Xi Jinping was chosen as his successor, which resulted in a smooth 
power transition (Ding, 2015: 56). 
In contrast to Hu’s presidency, which was characterised by a collective leadership 
strategy, Xi’s presidency has to an extent been characterised by a centralisation 
and concentration of power, which has made international media refer to Xi as the 
most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping (Ding, 2015: 60). Xi’s 
guiding principle through his presidency has been the “Four comprehensives”, 
which are: “Comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society; 
comprehensively deepen reform; comprehensively govern the country according 
to law; and comprehensively tighten party discipline.” (Lam, 2016: 409f). The 
policy of tightening the party discipline is perhaps the policy that has 
characterised Xi’s administration the most as the Communist Party’s authority has 
been strengthened and concentrated to the party elite. This concentration of power 
and authority has been called ‘top-level design’, and is by the Xi administration 
thought as necessary if China is to push its reforms to new heights (Lam, 2016: 
411).  
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5. Findings  
Below follows the critical discourse analysis that has been conducted on Chinese 
governmental white papers and position papers, and also analysis of opinion 
pieces published in Chinese newspapers that concerns the South China Sea. The 
discourse analysis is structured after Fairclough’s three dimensional model of 
discourse which explores the content dimension, the discursive practice and the 
social practice of the text. 
5.1 Defence white papers 2011 - 2015 
Below is the critical discourse analysis conducted on defence white papers and 
position papers released by the government. At the end of the analysis a table is 
shown summarising the main findings. 
5.1.1 Content dimension 
What is immediately observable when analysing Chinese governmental 
publications addressing the South China Sea dispute is the way that security 
language is used separately from when China claims sovereignty over the 
contested areas. This is perhaps most obvious in China’s official South China Sea-
policy document released in connection with the arbitral tribunal’s award where 
China’s claims to sovereignty are outlined. In this document the word ‘security’ is 
only mentioned a few times, and neither of these occasions is in the context of 
China’s own security, but instead in reference to regional security and stability 
(FMPRC, 2016a). China’s claim to sovereignty is in the document based fully on 
arguments concerning historical rights. However, it is also clearly stated that 
China has a lot of agency in maintaining this regional stability as: 
“China is an important force for maintaining peace and stability in the South 
China Sea […].China endeavors to achieve win-win outcomes through mutually 
beneficial cooperation, and is committed to making the South China Sea a sea of 
peace, cooperation and friendship” (FMPRC, 2016a). 
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China’s commitment to making the South China Sea into ‘a sea of peace, 
cooperation and friendship’, signals that China does not perceive the area to have 
these traits at this moment. Even though the term ‘security’ is not mentioned in 
any of these quotes it is possible to interpret them as referring to security 
dynamics and China’s option to quickly escalate the dispute if it chose to. The 
document effectively contrasts how ‘peace, cooperation and friendship’, which 
can be interpreted as the realm of politics, can be turned into conflict, which 
easily can be understood as the realm of security. In addition to this, China 
acknowledges that security dynamics are vessels through which cooperation and 
stability can be established as China “champions a new security vision featuring 
mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination” (FMPRC, 2016a). 
Consequently, what China signals through this statement is that a future solution 
for this dispute only is viable through changes to security dynamics, which in 
many ways excludes a negotiated outcome. The policy document is interesting as 
it in many ways shadows China’s military assertiveness towards the other 
claimants in how it outlines China’s position. China will not waver on its claims 
to ‘historical rights’ over the area and there can be no political or multilateral 
solution to the dispute as the dispute concerns issues of sovereignty, which 
effectively situates the dispute within a security context.   
The South China Sea dispute is not mentioned at any time in the defence white 
papers published in 2011 and 2013, although “[d]isputes over territorial and 
maritime rights” (FMPRC, 2011) are mentioned as issues that may threaten 
regional stability. The dispute is explicitly mentioned at one time in the 2015 
white paper where it is described in terms such as “provocative action” and 
“maritime rights”, and other actor’s actions are described as “meddling in South 
China Sea affairs”, while certain island disputes are referred to as still 
“smoldering” (FMPRC, 2015). Even though China is cautious with using security 
language when describing territorial disputes with other states it is noticeable that 
China perceive the South China Sea as Chinese sovereign territory, and that other 
actor’s actions in the area is a threat to sovereignty. 
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The content analysis conducted on Chinese defence white papers since 2011 
shows a progression in how security language is used. This is perhaps best 
exemplified by how China in its 2011 white paper is described as being in a: 
“critical phase of the building of a moderately prosperous society in an all-round 
way. Therefore, it faces heavy demands in safeguarding national security” 
(FMPRC, 2011). 
Development of the state is here to be ensured by upholding what can be 
considered traditional understanding of security. In the 2013 and 2015 white 
papers these formulations have changed in a way that indicate a progression in 
how China perceive security and development of the state, as it is stated that:  
“However, China still faces multiple and complicated security threats and 
challenges. The issues of subsistence and development security and the traditional 
and non-traditional threats to security are interwoven. Therefore, China has an 
arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and 
development interests” (FMPRC, 2013; FMPRC, 2015) 
What is interesting here is firstly that China’s development is made equal and 
connected to traditional and non-traditional security threats indicating a doctrine-
change in how essential continued development is for the Chinese government. 
Secondly, by using this language development is elevated from the political to the 
security realm as the term “development security” is used. Furthermore, the use of 
the word “subsistence”, a synonym for ‘provisions for survival’3, is telling as this 
choice of word signals the importance of import and export for China’s 
development. This emphasis on export and import, what can be understood as 
communications, is also shown later in the 2015 white paper when the security of 
overseas interests and strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are made 
equal to terrorism, natural disasters, regional turmoil and epidemics as “imminent 
issue[s]” of vulnerability for China (FMPRC, 2015): 
                                                     
 
3
 According to www.thesaurus.com 
Fredrik Moberg 
 
 
43 
 
 
“With the growth of China’s national interests, its national security is more 
vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious 
natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning 
energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as 
institutions, personnel and assets abroad”(FMPRC, 2015) 
As mentioned above, China is careful and tentative in its use of security language 
to describe disputes with neighbours regarding territorial issues. Instead these 
disputes are described in terms such as “maritime rights and interests” (FMPRC, 
2011; 2013; 2015; 2016) and “sovereignty” (FMPRC, 2011; 2013; 2015; 2016). 
However, even though China is cautious in using language that can ‘securitise’ an 
issue concerning active disputes, such as the South China Sea-dispute, there are 
also signs of the importance that is placed on outcomes that are connected to these 
disputes. The terms used by China, such as ‘subsistence’, ‘development security’ 
and ‘strategic sea lines of communication’, can be interpreted as ways in which 
China communicates with other actors in the dispute concerning the importance 
that is placed on gaining a favourable outcome of the dispute. 
5.1.2 Discursive practice 
In all Chinese defence white papers there exists a section that discusses “the 
security situation” for China and international issues that may affect China in the 
future. This reoccurring feature also gives the opportunity to look at how China’s 
perception of the world has changed over time. One of the most striking 
differences is that there is a notable change in the language, structure and content 
between the white papers released 2011 and 2013. The 2011 white paper called 
simply “China's National Defense in 2010” is very formal document that follows 
a very rigid structure. China’s security situation is in this document described as 
confronted by many “complex” security challenges, which is a reoccurring theme 
in the whole document (FMPRC, 2011). Even though the world is described as 
“peaceful and stable” it is acknowledged in reoccurring intervals that the 
international security situation is complex and that China needs to be vary of this 
(FMPRC, 2011). China’s security situation is also favourable even though “Asia-
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Pacific security is becoming more intricate and volatile”, which can refer to many 
different factors (FMPRC, 2011). One of the factors that makes China’s security 
situation increasingly complex is globalisation and competition about 
international order, as “[t]he international balance of power is changing, most 
notably through the economic strength and growing international status and 
influence of emerging powers and developing countries” (FMPRC, 2011). What 
is discernible from the white paper is a positive picture of the future of China 
whose international influence will continue to grow in the wake of the global 
economic crises. Societal change is a reoccurring theme in the document, which 
in many ways is an interesting feature of a defence white paper and perhaps 
indicates the perceived importance of adapting to social and technological 
changes that may affect the Chinese society in the future. Globalisation is one of 
these factors that contribute to the ‘complexity’ of China’s security situation 
through its all-encompassing power to change the way societies interact with each 
other. This is captured in the following quote that discusses the future global 
order:  
“The progress toward economic globalization and a multi-polar world is 
irreversible, as is the advance toward informationization of society. The current 
trend toward peace, development and cooperation is irresistible” (FMPRC, 2011) 
Even though globalisation is deemed as complexity-increasing factor, it is also 
seen as force for good as it is a generator of peace, development and cooperation. 
China is in this document quite clear about how they perceive the changing power 
dynamics in the world in the future resulting in a multi-polar world where USA 
loses its hegemony in global affairs. Multi-polarity is in realist-theory a political 
situation that is seen as unstable, with reference to the political situation leading 
up to the two world wars (Mearsheimer, 1995: 13). However in this document it 
can be interpreted that China make the prediction that economic globalisation will 
have the effect of stabilising multi-polarity through development and cooperation, 
which is an interesting view (FMPRC, 2011). The positive outlook on 
globalisation is an interesting feature of a defence white paper and perhaps 
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indicates the impact that China at this point thought the global economic crises 
would have on world politics and the power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region 
in its wake. 
The white paper released in 2013 is in many ways different from the previous 
white paper. This view is reinforced by the title of the section outlining China’s 
security environment which is titled “New situation, new challenges and new 
missions” and represents a new take on how China aim to employ the defence 
forces to ensure the interests and economic development of China (FMPRC, 
2013). The positive anticipation of the future of the 2011 white paper is in the 
2013 white paper replaced by a sober tone that worryingly describes a security 
situation significantly different compared to only two years before. What China 
refers to when describing a ‘new security situation’ most likely has to do with that 
“[t]here are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-
interventionism” (FMPRC, 2013), and perhaps more importantly that “[t]he Asia-
Pacific region has become an increasingly significant stage for world economic 
development and strategic interaction between major powers” (FMPRC, 2013). 
Later in the document the defence forces are mentioned in the context of 
“historical missions for the new stage in the new century” (FMPRC, 2013), where 
‘the new century’ can be seen as a reference to China’s ‘century of humiliation’, 
which the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 century is known in China as 
(Chen Weiss, 2014: 7-9). The notion of globalisation as a vessel for peace and 
development is in this document absent as more emphasis is placed on how China 
is to ensure the continued development of its economy. In the section “Supporting 
National Economic and Social Development”, which is a section that is absent in 
the previous white paper, it is stipulated that the Chinese defence forces shall, in 
addition to upholding social stability and participation in disaster relief, 
“safeguard maritime rights and interest” and “protect overseas interests” 
(FMPRC, 2013). The issues of “maritime rights” and “overseas interests” are here 
placed within the context of national development and not within the realm of 
sovereignty, as issues concerning territorial rights and interests often are framed 
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within. In the quote below it is evident how strategic lines of communication 
(SLOCs) and overseas interests are seen as issues of national security, which 
highlights the gravity that the Chinese government places on development as 
crucial for stability in China. 
“With the gradual integration of China's economy into the world economic 
system, overseas interests have become an integral component of China's national 
interests. Security issues are increasingly prominent, involving overseas energy 
and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) […]” (FMPRC, 
2013) 
The description of the challenges and situation that faces China as ‘new’ signals a 
change in China’s perception of the security situation in their proximity, 
especially considering that the defence forces are planned to be used in ‘new’ 
‘historical missions’ in the ‘new century’. This rhetoric coupled with a bleaker 
description of globalisation and the power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region is 
indicative of a China that wants to be more in control of its own security situation 
in the light of an increasingly volatile international order and regional security 
environment. The emphasis on economic development in the white paper 
furthermore alludes to the position of the Chinese government that development is 
a matter of national security. 
The defence white paper released in May 2015 continues on the path that was laid 
by the previous white paper in how China views the regional security situation 
and how it intends to employ its armed forces to ensure development. Even 
though there are big similarities between the 2013 and the 2015 white papers there 
also are key differences which indicate that the 2013 white paper was a departure 
point for future developments in Chinese policy and strategy. A key difference 
between the documents is the 2015 white paper’s more explicit focus on military 
strategy rather than policy issues. The military strategy drawn up in the document 
is put in reference to the overall purpose of the strategy which is outlined under 
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the section “Missions and strategic tasks of China’s armed forces” (FMPRC, 
2015) it is stated that:  
“China’s national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its centenary; 
and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, 
democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary. It is a Chinese Dream of achieving 
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (FMPRC, 2015) 
The armed forces role in the building of a ‘moderately prosperous society’ is here 
made clear as the development of China is framed in terms of ‘national strategic 
goal’. The last sentence in the quote also references China’s “century of 
humiliation” as it is stated that is the dream of the Chinese people to achieve 
‘rejuvenation’. This is further emphasised when it is stated that the armed forces 
shall in the “new historical period”: 
“[…]strive to provide a strong guarantee for completing the building of a 
moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieving the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (FMPRC, 2015) 
The development security-discourse in the document is in the document made 
explicit at several occasions as the armed force’s role in the continued 
development of China is stated. The word ‘development’ is mentioned 42 times in 
the document, while the word ‘sovereignty’ is only used 8 times, which again is 
an interesting feature in a defence white paper, as ‘sovereignty’ is a word that can 
be regarded as a word that traditionally is more relevant for a policy paper 
regarding the armed forces. The word ‘security’ is for reference used 84 times in 
the same document, which indicates the high emphasis on development in the 
document. This is further affirmed by the new policy for the employment of the 
armed forces which is built on the notion of a more ‘holistic’ understanding of 
security issues: 
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“it is necessary to uphold a holistic view of national security, balance internal 
and external security, homeland and citizen security, traditional and non-
traditional security, subsistence and development security, and China’s own 
security and the common security of the world” (FMPRC, 2015) 
What this seems to signal is China’s ambition to align their ‘traditional’ security 
objectives with their developmental objectives – the establishment of a 
moderately prosperous society – through a more ‘holistic’ outlook on what 
constitutes a threat to the Communist Party, the communist system in China and 
to regional stability. By applying this security policy China in a way signals that 
the leadership of China gives itself the right to interpret developments and actions 
by other actors as a threat to China’s security. The inclusion of ‘subsistence’ and 
‘development security’ in this formulation is indicative of a China that will not let 
other actors threaten China’s economic model and the success that it has brought 
with it. This quote can be put into the context of China’s dependency on the 
continuous imports of raw materials and natural resources in order to supply its 
many factories and the energy need. China is also dependent on the open oceans 
so that the goods produced in the country can reach consumers all around the 
world. If China is to maintain its place in the global value chain it is therefore 
dependent on strategic sea lines of communication being open, which in turn is 
highly dependent on regional stability. It is clear that the piracy activity in the 
Gulf of Aden has had an impact on Chinese strategic reasoning as the piracy 
conducted in the area showed how vulnerable shipping, the backbone of the 
global economy, is to even a low-budget militia as the Somali pirates. China even 
has a naval task force deployed to the Gulf of Aden since 2008 to escort Chinese 
and international ships through the area, which is mentioned in all analysed white 
papers as one of China’s most significant international contributions (FMPRC; 
2011; 2013; 2015). It is clear that China sees a connection between development 
and the continued freedom of navigation of the seas and the strategic sea lines of 
communication that connects the continents, which is further confirmed by below 
quote which describes “force development in critical security domains”:  
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“The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and 
sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs 
sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the 
seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests” (FMPRC, 2015) 
However, even though there exists a clear discourse concerning development 
security and the importance of regional stability as a major key for China’s 
‘rejuvenation’ there also exists another prevalent discourse – which is the ‘rights 
protection’- discourse. There seems to exist a form of tension and discrepancy 
between the ‘development security’-discourse and the ‘maritime rights’-discourse 
in China’s strategic planning, which even manifests itself in the above quote 
where the first sentence emphasises the importance of regional stability while the 
following sentence stresses the importance of protecting China’s rights and 
interests. This can be seen as an inconsistent form of reasoning, as upholding 
stability and at the same time pursuing ‘maritime rights’ to some extent are 
mutually excluding actions. However, this form of statement can also be 
indicative of a policy that implies a more assertive take on how regional stability 
is to be ensured. China wants to ensure that regional stability is guaranteed in their 
periphery, while they also are caught up in disputes over sovereignty issues in the 
same area. A possible solution to this, from a Chinese perspective, is to ensure 
stability through the presence of Chinese actors and armed forces, and in this way 
“managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests” 
(FMPRC, 2015). This approach to ‘development security’ and the protection of 
‘maritime rights and interests’ also mean that these two objectives can be aligned, 
as is the purpose of the ‘holistic’ approach, so that China can reach the main 
purpose of the white paper - which is the ‘great rejuvenation’ of the Chinese 
people.  
This more assertive approach to the maintenance of regional stability and the 
protection of rights is further supported by the way that China describes how its 
armed forces will be employed to reach its goals: 
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“A holistic approach will be taken to balance war preparation and war 
prevention, rights protection and stability maintenance, deterrence and 
warfighting, and operations in wartime and employment of military forces in 
peacetime” (FMPRC, 2015) 
It is here made clear that China is aware of the tension that exist between 
upholding regional stability and rights protection as it will be important to 
‘balance’ the two objectives. The 2015 white paper in many ways represents a 
new form of bluntness concerning how China is more upfront with how they plan 
to act in the future, which is a major departure from the careful language used in 
the 2010 white paper.  
5.1.3 Social practice 
As with the previous sections that analyse different aspects of the defence white 
papers released by the Chinese government there is an observable progression in 
which social dynamics that are discernible in the texts. The 2010 white paper, 
which in previous sections has been described as ‘rigid’ and ‘formal’, in many 
ways differs from the white papers that were released after it. The social 
relationship that is reproduced and emphasised throughout the whole document is 
the relationship between the armed forces and the Chinese people. There is a 
strong emphasis on China as a nation at several points in the document, as it is 
asserted that the armed forces has an obligation to protect what can be understood 
as a classic Westphalian interpretation of what constitutes a nation-state as 
emphasised here; 
“In accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and other 
relevant laws, the armed forces of China undertake the sacred duty of resisting 
foreign aggression, defending the motherland, and safeguarding overall social 
stability and the peaceful labor of its people”(FMPRC, 2010), 
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further emphasised here; 
“The Chinese armed forces loyally follow the tenet of serving the people 
wholeheartedly, actively participate in and support national economic and social 
development, and safeguard national security and social stability in accordance 
with the law” (FMPRC, 2010) 
In the document it is primarily ‘China’ as a unit and the Chinese people that are 
made the referent objects of security, which further alludes to the conclusion that 
the ‘nation’ of China is a more important unit than for example the Communist 
Party, the socialist system or the state in itself. It is first under the section called 
“military legal system” that the Communist Party is mentioned as an actor and 
unit, as this section describes how the armed forces shall abide by the constitution 
and laws. Again, this section is very formal as it describes how the National 
People’s Congress and the Central Military Committee of the Communist Party 
have created laws and guidelines that governs and steers how the armed forces 
shall fulfil its mission of protecting the Chinese nation (FMPRC, 2010). This very 
formal way of connecting the armed forces and the political leadership of the 
Communist Party implies that the government in China does not want to signal 
that there is strong political control over the armed forces, at least outward to 
international actors. 
Even though the 2013 white paper in many regards is a departure from the formal 
structure and content of the 2011 white paper it shares similarities with the 
preceding white paper concerning the units and referent objects of security that 
are acknowledged. The formulations that are observable in the preceding white 
paper are in this document observable again: 
“The fundamental tasks of China's armed forces are consolidating national 
defense, resisting foreign aggression and defending the motherland” (FMPRC, 
2013) 
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“The Constitution and relevant laws entrust China's armed forces with the 
important tasks of safeguarding the peaceful labor of the Chinese people, taking 
part in national development and serving the people wholeheartedly” (FMPRC, 
2013) 
Throughout the document no other referent object of security is mentioned and 
other units than the Chinese nation is hardly mentioned. The Communist Party is 
again solely mentioned in the context of the legal framework for the armed forces, 
indicating that armed forces are governed through laws and guidelines, and not by 
the political leadership of the Communist Party (FMPRC, 2013). The similarities 
between the 2011 and 2013 white papers concerning the referent objects of 
security, in the light of the differences concerning many of the discourses in the 
two documents, are interesting as it illuminates how the policy has developed over 
time. This is shown in the 2015 white paper which challenges this previous 
structure of security dynamics. 
As has been mentioned in the previous sections the 2015 white paper in many 
ways signals a new take on how the Chinese government view security and how 
security dynamics are structured. The 2015 white paper is markedly different 
compared to previous white papers in how the social relations between different 
units are described, signalling a further progression in the government’s view of 
security dynamics. Throughout the document there are three distinct different 
referent objects for security that are mentioned, which are: China as a nation, the 
Communist Party and the socialist system in China. The guidelines outlining the 
strategic tasks of the armed forces are interesting in the document as the 
intertextuality of the previous white papers concerning this aspect is not 
discernible. Gone is any mention of the armed forces protecting the Chinese 
people as the strategic task of the armed forces is formulated in a much more 
sterile way than previously:  
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“To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively 
safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea” 
(FMPRC, 2015) 
In general, the discourse of the ‘Chinese people’ and the Chinese nation are less 
prevalent in the 2015 white paper than previously, as there is less emphasis on the 
armed forces being the people’s armed forces. Instead, what is very obvious is 
that there has occurred an elevation of importance concerning other referent 
objects of security in the Chinese military doctrine, which is exemplified in the 
below quote:  
“China’s armed forces will effectively perform their missions in the new historical 
period, resolutely uphold the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system with 
Chinese characteristics, safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development 
interests, safeguard the important period of strategic opportunities for China’s 
development, maintain regional and world peace, and strive to provide a strong 
guarantee for completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (FMPRC, 
2015) 
The strategic goal to ‘resolutely uphold the leadership of the CPC’ (Communist 
Party) and the ‘socialist system’ are new additions to China’s defence white 
paper. This new goal is furthermore mentioned before the goal of safeguarding 
China’s sovereignty, which can be interpreted as a clear statement of 
prioritisation. In addition to this, the long-term goal of the ‘great rejuvenation’ is 
conditioned by among other things the continued leadership of the Communist 
Party, which again is a clear statement. All in all, the Communist Party is 
mentioned explicitly 14 times throughout the document (FMPRC, 2015), which is 
a major change compared to previous white papers where the party only was 
mentioned at very few occasions and in the context of legislature (FMPRC, 2011; 
2013). This new approach to the structuring of security relations is further 
emphasised in the following quote:  
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“At this new historical starting point, China’s armed forces will adapt themselves 
to new changes in the national security environment, firmly follow the goal of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) to build a strong military for the new situation, 
implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation” 
(FMPRC, 2015) 
In the quote it is acknowledged that China is at a ‘starting point’ for a new 
doctrine as the armed forces have to ‘adapt’, ‘build-up’ and ‘implement’ in order 
for China to reach to goal set by the Communist Party. It is through this statement 
acknowledged that there is a change in security dynamics in China, which in the 
light of the previous quote suggests that upholding the Communist Party’s is at 
the moment ordered above the nation-state of China as the main referent object of 
security.  
5.1.4 Summary 
The analysis conducted on the 2011, 2013 and 2015 white papers released by the 
Chinese government show that there has been a continuous progression from a 
rigid and vague document, as the 2011 white papers is, to a more confident and 
explicit document by 2015. The content of the documents also show a large 
degree of progression as many of the prevalent discourses of the 2011 white paper 
are replaced by other strong discourses concerning development and national 
interests in the 2013 and 2015 white papers. However, perhaps most interestingly 
the emergence of new referent objects of security signals changes in security 
dynamics within China. Below follows a table (1) outlining the major similarities 
and differences discussed in the previous sections: 
Document Language Discourse Referent 
objects 
White Paper, 
2011 
Traditional use of 
security 
“Globalisation will 
ensure development 
and stability” 
 
Nation 
White Paper, 
2013 
New wider 
application in the 
use of the word 
“Economic 
development is a 
national interest of 
Nation 
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‘security’ and 
‘national interest’ 
China” 
“Increasing 
hegemonism and neo-
interventionism” 
“New challenges, 
new missions,  new 
century” etc. 
White Paper, 
2015 
‘Holistic Security’ “Balance between 
rights protection and 
stability 
maintenance” 
“Vulnerability to 
international turmoil” 
“National 
rejuvenation”  
“Active defence” 
Nation 
Communist 
Party 
Socialist 
System 
Table 1. 
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6. Analysis 
The research design for this thesis was chosen due to the ambition to try to 
capture the process of securitisation in China’s communication through defence 
white papers with an elite audience and other functional actors, such as other 
regional state actors and USA. The decision to analyse defence white papers 
instead of sampling other forms of statements from Chinese government officials, 
such as press conferences and interviews, can in retrospect be questioned, as the 
research only garnered tentative signals of securitisation concerning the South 
China Sea. However, the analysis of the defence white papers enabled this thesis 
to collect data concerning security dynamics and social relations within China that 
is still of relevance for answering the research question that this thesis posed. 
Considering China’s actions in the South China Sea, which since 2010 has 
become more and more assertive, my expectations at the conception of this study 
was that a securitisation move could have occurred in Chinese governmental 
publications. This was due to the apparent urgency that China started to construct 
military bases on reefs and island-like features in the South China Sea during the 
2010s, which is an action usually undertaken in response to an imminent security 
threat. To seek acceptance for this type of action from the public through a 
securitisation move is therefore something that according to the Copenhagen 
School of Security Studies is to be expected as a precursor to the actions.  
Did the sampling and critical discourse analysis capture a securitisation move? 
The initial expectation of finding formulations concerning the South China Sea 
dispute that could be interpreted as securitisation in the material has not been met. 
The first level of the critical discourse analysis, the level of the text, shows that 
China has been very careful in how they have chosen to describe the South China 
Sea dispute in the analysed documents. The dispute is described in terms of 
‘maritime rights’ and not in terms of threats to security or sovereignty, even 
though it can be interpreted as ‘maritime rights’ alludes to issues concerning 
sovereignty. Instead, China’s careful wording and lack of security language 
concerning the dispute can be interpreted in two ways. Either China does not 
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perceive the South China Sea dispute as a security threat to China or the 
Communist Party, which the findings of this study contradict (discussed further 
later). Or, respectively, China is intent on keeping the South China Sea dispute 
outside of the realm of security by actively trying to de-securitise the dispute 
through its communications with the relevant audience and functional actors. This 
latter narrative is supported by Danner’s (2014) study of China’s dispute with 
Japan concerning territory in the East China Sea that was mentioned in the 
literature review, where Danner found that securitisation and de-securitisation 
occurred in a very strategic manner by the actors when nationalist support was 
needed to show resolve outward. China’s attempt to keep the South China Sea 
dispute outside the realm of security is interesting, as it perhaps alludes to a 
caution concerning audience costs, but it also gives Chinese leaders to in the 
future forcefully securitise the area and the dispute. A future securitisation of the 
dispute may therefore occur at a time when China deem it appropriate to increase 
the audience costs that they create in order to show resolve to other actors in the 
dispute – signalling a future strategic approach to securitisation of the South 
China Sea.  
Notwithstanding, Balzacq’s (2005) development of securitization theory is helpful 
in this context as it enables us to look at wider sets of variables concerning 
China’s actions. Balzacq’s posits “(i) that an effective securitization is audience-
centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective 
securitization is power-laden” (Balzacq, 2005: 171). China’s political structures, 
defence white papers and assertiveness in this light together becomes part of a 
bigger picture that can be interpreted as a securitisation. The following table 
illustrates this interpretation: 
Audience-centered: If the relevant audience for a securitising move in China are 
elites within the Communist Party, as this thesis posits, then the defence white 
papers can be seen as a way of communicating to the elites that the government 
will not let other state-actors threaten China’s rapid economic development or the 
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Communist Party’s rule. However, since an explicit securitisation move has not 
been captured by the sampling this is a tentative conclusion. Furthermore, the 
point of defence white papers is not to solely communicate with actors within 
China, putting into question if this condition can be fully met. 
Context-dependent: China is in a process of rapid economic growth at the same 
time as nationalist-sentiment has been growing in the country as China has 
become a global power. An escalation of tensions in the region between China, 
USA and other regional actors has been occurring since 2010. A securitisation of 
the South China Sea dispute by China in this light is something that almost can be 
regarded as expected. A securitisation of the dispute can therefore take the shape 
of many different forms of use of language, as the tensions in the region are 
already high. 
Power-laden: The Communist Party in China is an autocratic regime in a country 
with rapid economic growth with no free press. In this light the government or the 
Communist Party are the only actors that have enough agency to initiate a 
securitisation move. Furthermore, in the 2015 white paper there emerged a new 
take on how security dynamics function within China, which furthermore 
strengthens the Communist Party’s control over the armed forces and structures of 
social relations. These circumstances meet the condition of power. 
Table 2. 
In sum, with the help of Balzacq’s development of securitisation theory it can be 
concluded that the material gathered show that China’s white papers, coupled 
with its actions and political structures, meet two out of three conditions set out 
for a successful securitisation. However, since the sampling did not capture an 
explicit securitisation move it can be concluded that China has not securitised the 
South China Sea dispute. Notwithstanding, the findings consequently show that 
the surrounding circumstances for a securitisation move are favourable. 
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Even though the sampling and critical discourse analysis failed to capture an 
explicit securitisation move, the discursive analysis still gave some relevant 
findings concerning security dynamics in China in the context of the South China 
Sea, that are analysable with help of CST. The most interesting finding is perhaps 
China’s increasing use of the ‘development security’-discourse, which is very 
prevalent in the 2015 white paper. The findings can almost be interpreted as a 
securitisation move as some of the formulations concerning ‘development 
security’ are very explicit in how China perceives actions that can threaten the 
continued economic development of the state. This interpretation is further 
supported by the inclusion of development and economic narratives into a defence 
white paper, as these are issues not usually associated with armed forces. An 
interesting question that arises in this context is which unit that is the referent 
object of security in China’s ‘development security’ discourse. Buzan et al 
(1998:41) states that it should not be complicated to identify the referent object of 
a securitisation move as there always exists an organisational logic in agency and 
to the process. However, in the 2015 white paper, where the ‘development 
security’-discourse is most prevalent, there exists three different referent objects: 
China as a nation, the Communist Party and the socialist system in China. 
Notwithstanding, it should be understood that the defence white papers are 
products of the Chinese government, and in the end the Communist Party 
leadership. The inclusion and emphasis of the Communist Party, alongside China, 
as a referent object of security signals that political security is a sector that takes 
precedence in Chinese security dynamics. 
Out of the five sectors of security that is mentioned in the theory section of this 
thesis (military, political, economic, societal and environmental) there are mainly 
two sectors that are implicitly and explicitly prioritised in the white papers, which 
are military and political security. According to Buzan et al (1998) these two 
sectors in large are connected to each other as the social interactions that signify 
these dynamics are very similar. Issues about military security mostly arise out of 
the process of governance and questions about political legitimacy, which in 
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many ways align with the narrow understanding of security. Political security in 
many ways is also concerned about issues of sovereignty, even though political 
‘threats’ are about giving or denying recognition, support or legitimacy to a 
political unit. These ‘threats’ can be both internal, within the unit, and external, 
outside of the unit, which may have different consequences (Buzan et al, 1998: 
144). The ‘development security’-discourse, the emergence of several referent 
objects of security and China’s assertiveness in many ways align with these forms 
of security dynamics as the emphasis on issues of ‘maritime rights’ (military 
security) and ‘development security’ (political security) both can be seen as 
responses to perceived threats to both the territorial sovereignty of China and the 
political sovereignty of the Communist Party. Possible threats to these sectors can 
be found in the context of the South China Sea dispute as the area is vital for 
China’s economy through the strategic sea lines of communication, but also 
through the core issue of contestation about sovereignty concerning territory in 
the area. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, it can be argued that the 
political legitimacy of the Communist Party is in many ways tied to the continued 
economic development of China as there are elites within the country that have a 
lot to gain from China’s rapid economic growth. The Chinese government 
therefore has a strong incentive to actively secure this economic development, of 
which the South China Sea is a key factor.  
Lastly, the aspect of audience costs can help us to interpret the findings as well. 
Fearon (1997: 70) theorised that states can through either (i)“tying their hands” 
and commit fully to an dispute, which raises the costs, or (ii) sink costs, through 
careful de-escalation of the dispute, use audience costs in their foreign affairs. As 
was discussed above it seems clear that China is intent on having low audience 
costs in the South China Sea dispute, as no securitisation has been observed 
concerning the dispute. This is interesting as China have used audience costs in 
the East China Sea dispute with Japan (Danner, 2014) to communicate resolve. 
However, as Chen Weiss’ (2014) study of nationalist protests in China show they 
also represent a double-edged sword as these protests also can threaten the 
Fredrik Moberg 
 
 
61 
 
 
stability and order of the state and in this way threaten the political security of the 
Communist Party, which the Tiananmen Square student protests of 1989 clearly 
showed. China’s caution toward audience costs in the South China Sea dispute 
can therefore be interpreted as China is uncertain about what outcomes that can be 
expected of a violent escalation of the dispute. By not ‘tying their hands’ and 
inciting nationalist sentiment to create bargaining power in the dispute China is 
playing it safe and keeping their options open concerning future political solutions 
to the dispute. If China would decide to securitise the dispute and incite 
nationalist sentiment China would have to commit to the successful outcome of an 
escalation of the dispute. However, since USA has showed a lot of engagement in 
the South China Sea dispute through its’ so called ‘freedom of navigation-
operations’ and commitment to its allies in the region this means China would 
have to successfully outmanoeuvre a militarily superior adversary. China 
therefore is caught in a situation where they do not want to appear weak to its 
population nor want to incite too much nationalist sentiment which would force 
them in to confrontation with USA. As Chen Weiss notes about Chinese 
nationalist protests, when they erupt the protesters are in the driver’s seat through 
their quantity and power, as the sentiment they have against other states cannot be 
quelled by the government (Chen Weiss, 2014: 3f).The goal of the government is 
therefore to use the bargaining power which these protests create, while at the 
same time be careful to not incite protests when the timing is bad for the foreign 
policy. 
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7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to challenge the realist conception of China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea and in this way nuance the view of China’s 
motivations and incentives for their actions in the area. The question this thesis 
asked was if CST and a broadened security perspective, coupled with the concept 
of audience costs, could provide a competing understanding to Chinese 
assertiveness in the South China Sea dispute. The study has found that CST can 
provide a competing understanding of Chinese assertiveness, even though the 
process of securitisation was not captured by the sampling. The main findings of 
the study are, firstly, that China seems intent on keeping the South China Sea 
dispute outside the realm of security, due to their careful of words when 
describing and discussing the dispute. This intention of keeping the dispute within 
the political realm may have to do with the Communist Party’s wariness towards 
audience costs and the potential issue of nationalist protests escalating out of 
control, which can threaten the government’s legitimacy. Secondly, the Xi-
administration’s increasing emphasis on the discourses of ‘development security’ 
and ‘maritime rights’ in the light of China’s increasing assertiveness in the South 
China Sea supports the conclusion that the strategic sea lines of communication 
that run through the South China Sea are a key factor in China’s continued 
economic growth, and in the extension the continued political legitimacy of the 
Communist Party. China’s actions in the area should therefore be interpreted in 
the light of the political security of the government, as economic growth keeps the 
government’s legitimacy high. Thirdly, securitisation is not a process that occurs 
in a vacuum, but should instead as Balzacq (2005) states be seen as a strategic, 
context-dependent practice and not a self-contained universal practice. The thesis 
has found that China has the possibility to securitise the South China Sea if it 
chose to, which signifies the caution that the Chinese government shows toward 
the dispute. 
On an ending note, this study has tried to shine an alternate light on the South 
China Sea dispute to try and understand what incentives and motivations that has 
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driven China’s assertiveness. Important motivations and incentives that have been 
uncovered mostly have to do with the continued rule of the Communist Party in 
China and the socialist system, which are not revolutionary findings. However, 
the study has found that CST can be a valuable tool for uncovering security 
dynamics and social relations outside of a European context, which encourages 
further research along these lines. Important contributions that can be made in this 
area in the future concerns how securitisation is used strategically by other Asian 
actors to incite audience costs in international disputes. Another interesting issue 
is China’s economic and developmental engagement in Africa, which can fit into 
an analysis concerning a broadened understanding of security. 
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